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ARGUMENTS 
I. NOTWITHSTANDING THE STATE'S CLAIMS, THE RECORD 
DEMONSTRATES THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 
DETERMINING THAT THE TOTALITY OF THE FACTS AND 
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE STOP DID NOT CONSTITUTE A 
SEIZURE REQUIRING REASONABLE SUSPICION. 
The State argues that "the officers acted with reasonable 
suspicion." See Brief of Appellee, pp. 16-22. In conjunction 
with its argument, the State claims that Ms. Hughes "fails to 
properly challenge the trial court's factual findings." Id. at 
pp. 12-16. Finally, the State contends that Ms. Hughes failed to 
preserve her claim that she was seized because the officers 
retained her "small little wooden mini bat".1 Id. at pp. 15-16. 
These arguments are without merit for the reasons set forth, in 
turn, below. 
A. The Marshaling Requirement Does Not Apply 
Because This Appeal Involves the Trial 
Court's Application of the Law to the Facts. 
In the course of denying the Motion to Suppress, the trial 
court ruled as follows: 
My best view of this, counsel, is that this never 
got beyond a level 1 encounter. It's clear from reading 
the relevant case law that request for identification, 
that doesn't constitute a show of authority, and by the 
way I've read State of Utah vs. Mike O'Leary Dean and 
also Salt Lake City vs. Carolyn L. Rae. And they 
discuss the difference between a level 1 and level 2 and 
xDeputy Butcher referred to it as being a "small little wooden 
mini bat" in the course of his testimony elicited during the 
evidentiary hearing on the matter (R. 171:29:13-24). 
1 
that's really the critical question here, in my mind at 
least. They discussed examples of circumstances that 
mights indicate a level 2 or a seizure. It could be the 
threatening presence of several officer[s], the display 
of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the 
person, or the use of language or tone of voice 
indicating that compliance with the officer's request 
might be compelled. I didn't se,e that in any of the 
evidence before me. It's clear in that same case, in 
the Salt Lake City case I mentioned, the court indicated 
that request for identification alone as a matter of law 
does not constitute a show of authority sufficient to 
convert an innocent encounter into a seizure. In my 
view, this never got beyond level 1. The search was 
consistent - was pursuant to consent and I must deny the 
motion. 
See R. 171:58-59. 
The proper standard of review to be applied in the instant 
case was clarified by the Utah Supreme Court not so long ago in 
State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, 103 P.3d 699, where the Court stated 
that the reviewing court is to apply a "non-deferential review" to 
the "application of the law to the underlying factual findings in 
search and seizure cases." Id. at 1fl5, 103 P. 3d 699; see also 
Layton City v. Oliver, 2006 UT App 244, ^11, 139 P.3d 281 ("We 
review the trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress for 
correctness, without deference to the trial court's application of 
the law to the facts.") (citing State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, i|l5, 
103 P.3d 699). 
In the instant case, the trial court, in the course of 
applying what it believed to be the relevant case law to the 
2 
facts, concluded that "this never got beyond a level 1 encounter." 
(R. 171:58:10-11). Moreover, the trial court, itself, believed 
this to be the "critical question" (R. 171:58:16-17). Because 
this case involves a question concerning the trial court's 
application of the law to the facts, the marshaling requirement, 
as a matter of necessity, does not apply. 
B. Ms. Hughes Properly Preserved the Seizure 
Argument for Appeal. 
"As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court 
may not be raised on appeal." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^ 11, 
10 P.3d 346; see also State v. Cruz, 2006 UT 45, %22, 122 P.3d 
543. "The 'mere mention' of an issue without introducing 
supporting evidence or relevant legal authority does not preserve 
that issue for appeal." State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 361 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1993) (citation omitted). This preservation requirement 
is based on the policy that, "in the interest of orderly 
procedure, the trial court ought to be given an opportunity to 
address a claimed error and, if appropriate, correct it." 
Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at fll (quotations omitted). Consequently, an 
objection "must at least be raised to a level of consciousness 
such that the trial [court] can consider it." Brown, 856 P. 2d at 
361. 
3 
In the case at bar, appointed trial counsel explicitly raised 
the seizure argument, which included the particular circumstance 
of the officers retaining her "small little wooden mini bat", by 
not only arguing such in the Memorandum in support of the Motion 
to Suppress but by way of the elicited testimony of Deputies 
Butcher and Hawkins during the evidentiary hearing. See R. 23, 
Memorandum in Support of Motions to Suppress and to Dismiss; see 
also R. 171:29:8-24, R. 171:43-44. Ms. Hughes' evidence and 
argument concerning the "small little wooden mini bat" was part 
and parcel with her argument that she was seized for purposes of 
the Fourth Amendment "when the officer "'by means of physical 
force or show of authority ha [d] in some way restrained the 
liberty'" of her person. State v. Bean, 869 P.2d 984, 986 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994) (quoting Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 552, 100 S.Ct. at 
1876 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 
1879 n.16 (1968)). By virtue of such, the issue, at the very 
least, was raised to a level of consciousness such that the trial 
court could consider it. See State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36, 1fl4, 7 8 
P. 3d 590 (stating that when determining the validity of a 
detention, the court "must view the articulable facts in their 
totality and avoid the temptation to divide the facts and evaluate 
them in isolation."); see also United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 
4 
1, 8 (1989) (requiring a review of "the totality of the 
circumstances -- the whole picture"). 
C« The Circumstances Surrounding the Stop by 
Deputies Butcher and Hawkins Demonstrated a 
Show of Authority Sufficient to Convert the 
Stop from a Level One to a Level Two 
Encounter. 
There are three different levels of police-citizen encounters 
under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
which are as follows: 
(1) An officer may approach a citizen at any time 
and pose questions so long as the citizen is not 
detained against his will; (2) an officer may 
seize a person if the officer has an articulable 
suspicion that the person has committed or is 
about to commit a crime . . .; (3) an officer may 
arrest a suspect if the officer has probable cause 
to believe an offense had been committed or is 
being committed. 
State v. Markland, 2005 UT 26, KlO n.l, 112 P. 3d 507 (quoting 
State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761, 763 (Utah 1991)). A level one 
encounter n'is a voluntary encounter where a citizen may respond 
to an officer's inquiries but is free to leave at any time.'" 
Salt Lake City v. Ray, 2000 UT App 55, 111, 998 P.2d 274 (citing 
State v. Jackson, 805 P. 2d 765, 767 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) and State 
v. Bean, 869 P.2d 984, 986 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)). "As long as a 
person 'remains free to disregard the questions and walk away, 
there has been no intrusion upon that person's liberty or privacy 
as would under the Constitution require some particularized and 
5 
objective justification.'" Jackson, 805 3?. 2d at 767 (quoting 
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 
1877 (1980)). 
In contrast to the level one stop, the person, under a level 
two stop, is seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment "when the 
officer uxby means of physical force or show of authority has in 
some way restrained the liberty'" of a person. Bean, 869 P.2d at 
986 (quoting Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 552, 100 S. Ct. at 1876 
(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879 
n.16 (1968)). Thus, a level one encounter becomes a level two 
stop and ua seizure under the fourth amendment occurs when a 
reasonable person, in view of all the circumstances, would believe 
he or she is not free to leave." Jackson, 8 05 P.2d at 767. This 
occurs "even if the purpose of the stop is limited and the 
resulting detention brief." State v. Steward, 806 P. 2d 213, 216 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991); see also State v. Sierra, ISA P.2d 972, 975 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 
653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1395 (1979)). Some examples of circumstances 
indicating a seizure, even where the person did not attempt to 
leave include "vthe threatening presence of several officers, the 
display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the 
person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice 
indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be 
6 
compelled. '" State v. Patefield, 927 P. 2d 655, 659 (Utah Ct. App. 
1996) (quoting Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554, 100 S.Ct. At 1877). 
Arguably, Deputy Butcher's initial request for identification 
alone did not constitute a level two stop. However, any level one 
encounter escalated to a level two stop during Deputy Butcher's 
investigation. 
Deputy Butcher initially confronted Ms. Hughes and her two 
male companions by pulling his patrol vehicle near to where they 
stood on the side of the road, stepping out of his car and 
ordering them to come back, asking them, "[W]hat [i]s going on"? 
Deputy Butcher asked each of them for their age and identification 
because they "appeared somewhat young" to him. They provided 
their names and dates of birth inasmuch as they did not have any 
identification. At that point, Deputy Butcher did not run a 
records check of the personal information but rather straightway 
inquired whether they had any weapons without observing anything 
that caused him to believe there were any weapons on them.2 Ms. 
Hughes, upon Deputy Butcher's request, responded by retrieving "a 
small little wooden mini bat" from her coat sleeve. Deputy 
Butcher then began checking for weapons by performing a pat down 
check of one of Ms. Hughes' male companions, during which he 
2A period of "several minutes" transpired before running the 
records check (R. 171:15-16). 
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located a knife. During that pat down check, Deputy Butcher also 
located some finger scales and what appeared to be marijuana. He 
then took the male companion into custody and called for backup. 
When the second uniformed deputy responded in another patrol 
vehicle, he approached Ms. Hughes and immediately asked her if she 
had any weapons. Ms. Hughes responded by informing him that she 
had previously surrendered the mini wooden bat to Deputy Butcher. 
Nevertheless, Deputy Hawkins said that he was going to pat her 
down for weapons, to which she said "no.'' He then told her that 
uit wasn't going to be that thorough of a search." 
Taking the totality of the circumstances into consideration, 
a reasonable person in Ms. Hughes' position would not feel free to 
just walk away by abandoning her property, let alone approaching 
Deputy Butcher to take back her property and leave. Rather, 
Deputy Butcher's accusatory tone of voice and language, retention 
of property,3 pat down, and custody of her male companion 
sufficiently restrained Mr. Hughes' freedom to the point that she 
was seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. 
"'[A] level two stop . . . must be supported by reasonable 
suspicion [or it] violates the Fourth Amendment to the United 
See Salt Lake City v. Ray, 2005 UT App 55, fl4, 998 P.2d 274 
(discussing how the retention of personal items coupled with other 
factors create a show of official authority such that a reasonable 
person would not believe he or she was free to leave). 
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States Constitution.'"4 Salt Lake City v. Ray, 2005 UT App 55, 
Kl8f 998 P.2d 274 (quoting State v. Bean, 869 P.2d 984, 988 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994)); see also Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 ("A peace 
officer may stop any person in a public place when he has a 
reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or is in the act 
of committing or is attempting to commit a public offense and may 
demand his name, address and an explanation of his actions."). 
Even though this standard is lower than the standard required for 
probable cause to arrest, the same totality of facts and 
circumstances approach is utilized to determine if there are 
sufficient "specific and articulable facts" to support reasonable 
suspicion. Ray, 2005 UT App 55 at ^18 (citations omitted). uxIn 
determining whether this objective standard has been met, the 
focus necessarily centers upon the facts known to the officer 
immediately before the stop.'" Id. (quoting State v. Friesen, 
1999 UT App 262, ^12, 988 P.2d 7). 
Due to the facts known to Deputies Butcher and Hawkins at the 
time of the seizure, there was no reasonable articulable suspicion 
supporting the seizure of Ms. Hughes. The facts known to the 
4
"When challenged, the [S]tate has the burden of proving the 
reasonableness of the officer's actions during an investigative 
detention." State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, [^23, 164 P. 3d 397 (citing 
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497-500 (1983); United States v. 
Carhee, 27 F.3d 1493, 1496 & n.2 (10th Cir. 1994)). 
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Deputies were, at the very least, as consistent with lawful 
behavior as with the commission of a crime. In fact, their 
testimony confirms such. As a result, there exists no basis upon 
which to justify the level two stop and seizure of Ms. Hughes, 
which violated her rights under the Fourth Amendment. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, as well as that set forth in the 
previously filed Brief of Appellant, Ms. Hughes respectfully 
requests that this Court reverse the trial court's denial of her 
motion to suppress and remand the case for further proceedings 
consistent with this Court's instructions as set forth in its 
opinion. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this \Q da\rof November, 2008. 
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ADDENDA 
No Addendum is utilized pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 24(a) (11) . 
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